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FAMILY LAW-CHILD ABUSE-HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA'S CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAW AFFORDED
NECESSARY PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO ALLEGED ABUSER.
Cruz v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. -, 472 A.2d 725
(1984).
In Cruz v. Commonwealth1 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court 2 was faced with the question of whether a hearing conducted
under the authority of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Laws
complied with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
4
For the first time, the court determined the due process rights of a
person accused of child abuse5 under this law. In weighing the rights
of the accused against the best interests of the child, the court held
that the accused's sixth amendment right to confrontation and cross-
examination is not an indispensible right in a child abuse hearing.
On October 14, 1980, a report was filed with the Berks County
Children & Youth Services' alleging that Alcides Cruz had sexually
abused his minor daughter.7 An agency social worker conducted an
investigation. As a result, a report of indicated8 child abuse was filed
I. - Pa. Commw. ., 472 A.2d 725 (1984).
2. Judge Williams wrote the unanimous decision of the court.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. II §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
5. Child Protective Services Law § 2203 states in part:
"Child abuse" means serious physical or mental injury which is not explained by
the available medical history as being accidental, or sexual abuse or sexual ex-
ploitation or serious physical neglect, of a child under 18 years of age, if the
injury, abuse or neglect has been caused by the acts or omissions of the child's
parents or by a person responsible for the child's welfare . ...
6. Section 2216 of the Child Protective Services Law provides that each county shall
have a child protective service within the county's children and youth social service agency.
The service is the sole civil agency responsible for receiving and investigating reports of child
abuse.
7. The Child Protective Service Law, defines a minor as anyone under the age of 18.
See supra note 5. Cruz's daughter, the alleged victim, was 14 years old at the time of the
hearing. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at - , 472 A.2d at 727.
8. Child Protective Services Law § 2203 states in part:
"Indicated report" means a report made pursuant to this act if any investigation
by the child protective service determines that substantial evidence of the alleged
abuse exists based on (i) available medical evidence, (ii) the child protective
service investigation or (iii) an admission of the acts of abuse by the child's
parent or person responsible for the child's welfare.
A founded report, as defined by § 2203, is "a report made pursuant to this act if there has
been any judicial adjudication based on a finding that a child who is a subject of the report has
been abused."
in Pennsylvania's central register 9 in November of 1980. A month
later, Alcides Cruz requested that the report be expunged1" from the
central register. The Director of Protective Services Programs of the
Department of Public Welfare denied his request."
Cruz then requested a hearing.12 The request was granted and,
on June 9, 1981. A hearing was held before the Department of Pub-
lic Welfare's Office of Hearings and Appeals. The hearing officer
took testimony from the investigating social worker and the Director
of Child Protective Services"3 then questioned the alleged abuse vic-
tim and her twelve year old brother 14 in camera, with only the attor-
neys present. The hearing officer recommended that the request for
expungement be denied, and the Secretary of the Department of
Public Welfare accepted the recommendation. As a result, Alcides
Cruz appealed the order denying expungement to the Common-
wealth Court.15
On appeal, Cruz challenged the order by arguing that several
procedural defects in the hearing constituted a breach of his right to
due process of law.' 6 Cruz further challenged the order by asserting
that the Child Protective Services Law, which sanctioned the hear-
ing, was itself unconstitutional.' 7 The court limited its scope of re-
view of the hearing to a determination of (1) whether substantial
evidence existed to support the findings, (2)whether the hearing of-
9. Child Protective Services Law § 2214 provides for the establishment of a statewide
central register of all founded and indicated reports of child abuse in the state.
10. Child Protective Services Law states that "'[e]xpunge' means to strike out or oblit-
erate entirely so that the expunged information may not be stored, identified, or later recov-
ered by any means mechanical, electronic, or otherwise."
I1. Indicated and founded reports cannot be expunged from the central register until
the subject child reaches the age of 18. When the child reaches 18, the report will be expunged
unless there is a subsequent report involving the same child, a sibling, or another child in the
care of the persons responsible for the subject child's welfare. Child Protective Services Law §
2215(n).
12. Section 2215(d) of the Child Protective Services Law gives a subject of a report the
right to request a hearing before the Secretary or a designated agent of the Department of
Public Welfare to challenge a denial of a request to expunge a report.
13. Alcides Cruz declined to testify on his own behalf. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at
472 A.2d at 727.
14. The brother of the alleged abuse victim had been an eyewitness to the repeated
incidents of sexual intercourse between the victim and her father, Alcides Cruz. Id. at __,
472 A.2d at 731.
15. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763(a)(1)(1982) grants jurisdiction to the Commonwealth
Court over all appeals from Commonwealth agencies having statewide jurisdiction.
16. Cruz contended (1) that his sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine
an adverse witness was violated when the hearing officer conducted an in camera interview
with Cruz's children, (2) that the statute of limitations prescribed by the Law had run, (3)
that the Department of Public Welfare was incorrect in nor requiring the alleged victim to
undergo medical and psychiatric examinations, (4) and that the Department's determination
was based on less than substantial evidence. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at -, 472 A.2d at
725.
17. Cruz argued that the Law was unconstitutional because it did not give the accused
an unqualified right to ascertain the identity of the person who made the initial report. Id. at
-. 472 A.2d at 729.
ficer conducted the hearing in compliance with applicable law, and
(3) whether Cruz's constitutional rights were violated. 8
Child abuse and neglect are not a novel problem, nor are they
problems more prevalent in one society or culture than in another."
Although occurrences of child abuse and neglect seem more wide-
spread today, 0 incidents involving the victimization of children have
occurred throughout history.2" Despite the vast amount of research
conducted in recent years on the problem, its solution remains
elusive.
The diverse theories propounded by scholars concerning the
causes of child abuse22 create one of the difficulties encountered by
social service agencies in identifying and treating child abuse and
neglect victims. Popular myths about the characteristics of abusers,
perpetuated by a society unwilling to accept that there are no stere-
otypicic child abusers, exacerbate the difficulties. 3 Until recently,
legislators did not recognize child abuse as a problem, distinct from
other juvenile problems. Social service agencies, therefore, lacked
specific legislation, which hindered their ability to protect children.
18. Id. at - , 472 A.2d at 729 (quoting the scope of review in appeals from adjudica-
tions of the Department of Public Welfare that was set out in Montgomery County Child
Welfare Services v. Hull, 51 Pa. Commw. 1, 3-4, 413 A.2d 757, 759 (1980)). For the statutory
authority for this scope of review see 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (1982).
19. Studies on child abuse and neglect traditionally deal with Western cultures. For a
collection of essays examining child abuse and neglect in Taiwan, New Guinea, Republic of
China, India, Japan, Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa, Polynesia, and native South America see
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Korbin ed. 1981).
20. Some critics contend that the occurrence of child abuse only appears to be on the
rise because mandatory reporting laws and improved child abuse legislation have spawned in-
creased reporting of suspected cases that would otherwise have gone untreated. See S.
O'BRIEN, CHILD ABUSE: A CRYING SHAME 8 (1980).
21. "Maltreatment of children has been justified for many centuries by the belief that
severe physical punishment was necessary either to maintain discipline, to transmit educational
ideas, to please certain gods, or to expel evil spirits." Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and
Infanticide, in THE BATTERED CHILD 3-17 (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968). See also GIO-
VANNONI & BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE 31-75 (1979) (an overview of the history of
child abuse in the United States from colonial times to the 1970's).
22. For many years, it was generally agreed that physical abuse of a child was caused
by severe emotional pressures on one or both of the parents. With the relatively recent in-
creases in the study of child abuse several other views have gained wide acceptance. One view
is that our cultural heritage and societal prediliction for violence make abuse a natural and
inevitable result. Another view is that child abuse and neglect are closely related to economic
poverty. A third view is that multiple causes such as alcoholism, family stress, learned behav-
ior, mental retardation, and poverty combine to create an environment conducive to abuse and
neglect. OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PREVENTION
AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS 11-8 (1978). See also infra note 23 and accompa-
nying text.
23. M. HALPERIN, HELPING MALTREATED CHILDREN 50-66 (979). Examines and ex-
poses the myths that surround the causes of child abuse and the people who are abusers. See
also Steele & Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Chil-
dren, in THE BATTERED CHILD 103 (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968); S. O'BRIEN, CHILD
ABUSE: A CRYING SHAME 45-50 (1980) ("Parents who abuse or neglect children do not appear
unusual.").
Although all states have mandatory child abuse reporting laws,", in
many instances these laws focus on punishing the abuser rather than
affording help to the victim.2 5 Thus, no explicit guidelines dealt
solely with the identification and treatment of child abuse and neg-
lect victims.
In 1973, under the leadership of Senator Walter F. Mondale,
the Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth conducted a series
of hearings throughout the country in response to a growing concern
that the existing state child abuse reporting and protection laws were
inadequate and ineffective.2 6 The study revealed that the lack in
many state laws of a working definition of child abuse and neglect
often rendered social service agencies powerless to protect children.2
Congress responded to these findings by passing the Federal Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974.28 The Act established
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect,2 9 which provides
research and technical assistance as well as an information clearing-
house for private and state child protection programs."0 To promote
24. For a statutory compilation of the child abuse and neglect mandatory reporting
laws of every state, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands, see Fraser, A Pragmatic
Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 104
n.4 (1974).
25. "[N]either federal nor state laws had come to grips with the problem of child abuse
and neglect. In the states, the focus was almost entirely on prosecuting cases. There were few
treatment programs." Mondale, Introductory Comments, Child Abuse Symposium, 54 CHI[-
]KENT L. REV. 635, 636 (1978).
26. See OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Preface to FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS at xi (1978); Mondale, Intro-
ductory Comments, Child Abuse Symposium, 54 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 635 (1978).
27. Traditionally, the statutory definitions of child abuse and neglect have either been
too narrow, so that many children in need of help fell outside the scope of the statute, or too
vague, resulting in the risk of unjustified state intervention into the family. See generally Cle-
ments, Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729 (1977) (discussion
of the need for a precise and limited legal definition of child abuse).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 5101(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5101(b) provides in part that:
The Secretary, through the Center, shall
(I) Annual research summary
compile, analyze, publish, and disseminate a summary annually of recently
conducted and currently conducted research on child abuse and neglect;
(2) Information clearinghouse
develop and maintain an information clearinghouse on all programs, includ-
ing private programs, showing promise of success, for the prevention, identifica-
tion, and treatment of child abuse and neglect;
(3) Training materials for personnel
compile, publish and disseminate training materials for personnel who are
engaged or intend to engage in the prevention, identification, and treatment of
child abuse and neglect;
(4) Technical assistance
provide technical assistance (directly or through grant or contract) to public
and nonprofit private agencies and organizations to assist them in planning, im-
proving, developing, and carrying out programs and activities relating to the pre-
vention, identification, and treatment of child abuse and neglect;
(5) Research into causes, prevention, identification and treatment
these programs throughout the country, the Act provides for tederal
funding to states that meet certain qualifications, to be used in devel-
oping, strengthening, and implementing child abuse prevention and
treatment programs.
31
In response to this congressional inducement, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly adopted the Child Protective Services Law.32 The
law defines child abuse more comprehensively than the Juvenile
Act,33 thus making the job of the social services agencies and of the
courts easier than in the past. The law also increases the availability
of information and abuse reports to child protection agencies
through the establishment of a statewide central register.34 A provi-
sion in the law protects the privacy of those involved in a child abuse
investigation by limiting access to these reports to selected agencies,
officials, or other persons acting on behalf of the child. 5 The law
further ensures confidentiality by restricting the reports contained in
the register to those that are either founded or indicated."
The central register plays a crucial role in child protective ser-
vices. The register aids physicians and hospitals in identifying pat-
terns of abuse. It also serves as a monitoring device to ensure that
local child protective agencies investigate reports promptly and pro-
vide the necessary services to the child and parents. A central regis-
ter also helps detect "hospital skipping," a practice by which abusive
parents take their injured children to different hospitals to avoid sus-
picion.3 7 The Law also improves the results of child abuse prevention
and treatment efforts by focusing the efforts on the treatment of the
family as a whole rather than on the separation of the child from the
family. 8
Critics have voiced concern about the potentially adverse affects
conduct research into the causes of child abuse and neglect, and into the
prevention, identification, and treatment thereof;
31. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2).
32. See supra note 3.
33. The Juvenile Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6365 (1982) defines a dependent
child as one who "is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required
by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
morals . i..." Id. § 6302. For the more comprehensive definition of child abuse set out in §
2203 of the Child Protective Services Law, see supra note 5.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. It § 2214(a).
35. Those authorized to obtain access to records include officials of a child protective
service acting in the course of official duties, a physician or hospital that is treating a child
who is suspected of being abused, a guardian ad litem for the child, courts of competent juris-
diction, Attorney General, and law enforcement officials. Id. § 2215(a).
36. Id. § 2214(h).
37. See PA. LEGIS. J. S926 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975) (statement of Sen. O'Pake).
38. Section 2202 of the Child Protective Services Law declares that one of the purposes
of the Act is to provide "rehabilitative services for children and parents involved so as to
ensure the child's well-being and to preserve and stabilize family life wherever appropriate
that child abuse prevention legislation may have on the family. 9 In
response to this concern, courts have required child protection agen-
cies to justify the removal of the child from the family by more than
a mere showing that the removal is in the child's best interest."' In
Santosky v. Kramer"1 the United States Supreme Court held that
nothing less than "clear and convincing evidence" may be used by a
court when deciding whether to terminate parental rights. 2 The par-
ents' fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their
child is not diminished by their failure to be exemplary parents. On
the contrary, parents' interest in preserving their family life may be
increased because the state's intervention on behalf of the chid may
seem to threaten the family unit."3 There are instances, nevertheless,
when the state's interest as parens patriae" overrides the parents'
interest, thus justifying the state's disruption of a family. "5
Courts devote special attention to parents' due process rights in
child abuse or neglect proceedings in which a parent is the accused.
The nature and possible ramifications of such a proceeding requires
that procedural safeguards are followed so that any decision cur-
tailing parental rights is in accordance with the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment." While courts carefully guard parents'
due process rights, they have not consistently deemed parents' sixth
39. "To give the government total unconditional authority to prescribe regulations em-
powering the state to take children away from parents may be characteristic of a totalitarian
state such as Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. It certainly has no place in the United States of
America." H.R. REP. No. 685, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. - , reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2763, 2772 (emphasis in the original) (dissenting view of Rep. Earl F. Lan-
dgrebe on the proposed Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act). See also PA. LEGIS. J.
H2996 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1975) (Pennsylvania House of Representatives debate on proposed
Child Protective Services Law).
40. If a child were taken from a home, over the objections of the family, because the
removal was shown to be in the best interests of the child, but without any showing of the
unfitness of the parents, the due process clause would be offended. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citing with approval Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 862 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
41. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
42. Id. at 769. The Supreme court held the N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (Consol. 1981) to
be unconstitutional because it required only a preponderance of the evidence to support a
finding that a child is permanently neglected.
43. Id. at 753.
44. " 'Parens patriae' literally means 'father of the country,' and traditionally refers to
the role of the state as guardian of persons under legal disabilities, such as juveniles or the
insane." In re Eberhardy's Guardianship, 97 Wis.2d 654, 659 n.6, 294 N.W.2d 540, 543 n.6
(1980).
45. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1156 (1980) (an analysis of the sources of the state's authority and interest in inter-
vening in the family on behalf of a child).
46. See Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1979) (indigent parents have a right
to court appointed counsel in child abuse or neglect proceedings); Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp.
258 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (parents have a right to counsel in child dependency proceedings); Al-
sager v. District Court of Polk City Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (parents must
receive notice in a parental termination proceeding advising them of the factual basis for the
proposed termination).
amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination4 7 deemed
essential to a fair adjudication in child abuse or neglect proceedings.
Courts have often regarded custody hearings in divorce proceed-
ings as analogous to child abuse and neglect proceedings with re-
spect to sixth amendment rights. 8 While all courts recognize that a
defendant has a constitutional right' 9 to confront and cross-examine
an opposing witness in traditional adversarial proceedings,50 that
same right has not been deemed indispensible in custody proceedings
when a child is interviewed in camera to determine which parent the
child prefers.51 Child custody proceedings are not typically charac-
terized as adversarial proceedings because the parent is not pitted
against the child nor the child against the parent. Rather, in a cus-
tody proceeding the court tries to determine the best result for both
the child and the parent. Similarly, a child abuse or neglect proceed-
ing falls outside the traditional adversarial setting because the child,
although testifying to the parent's conduct, is not pitted against the
parent. Rather, the court and the child protective service treat the
child, the parents and other family members as one entity and focus
attention on what is best for the family as a whole. Accordingly, a
number of courts have held that the sixth amendment right to con-
frontation and cross-examination does not apply in child abuse and
neglect proceedings when the child testifies in camera, provided that
certain procedural safeguards are met. 2
47. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
48. "[C]ases in which parents are vying for custody of children in contested divorce
actions [are] highly analogous to dependency proceedings, in that both are civil in nature, the
issues and relief sought are often- parallel, and the welfare of the child is always involved." In
re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 50, - n.3, 638 P.2d 717, 724
n.3 (1981).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
50. The sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses has
been deemed essential in the traditional adversarial proceeding so that any bias, malice, hostil-
ity, or unreliability on the part of the witness may be revealed. The right has been held to be
necessary in a wide variety of adversarial proceedings. See, e.g, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (civil rights action challenging administrative practices in a state correctional facil-
ity); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (criminal prosecution for armed robbery); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare payments); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959) (wrongful discharge action in which the plaintiff was charged with commu-
nistic associations).
51. For cases allowing an in camera interview of a child in a custody dispute to deter-
mine the child's parental preference, see Strain v. Strain, 95 Idaho 104, 523 P.2d 36 (1974);
Currier v. Currier, 271 Minn. 369, 136 N.W.2d 55 (1965); Walker v. Walker, 40 Ohio
App.2d 6, 317 N.E.2d 415 (1974); Cheppa v. Cheppa, 246 Pa. Super. 149, 369 A.2d 854
(1977). For cases that hold that an in camera interview of a child in a custody dispute is per se
unconstitutional, see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 382 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1964); Cook v. Cook, 5
N.C. App. 652, 169 S.E.2d 99 (1969).
52. "Unlike the right of a criminal defendant to confrontation, it is established that
such rights are not universally applicable to all hearings." In re Jones, 240 Pa. Super. 382,
385, 429 A.2d 671, 675 (1981) (emphasis in original). See also In re Maricopa County Juve-
nile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 50, 638 P.2d 717 (1981):
[Wle .are not here faced with the usual adversary proceeding involving the life,
If a court bars a parent from the in camera interview of the
child, due process requires that the parent's attorney be present.53
The attorney may then cross-examine the child on behalf of the par-
ent to test the credibility or reliability of the witness and to uncover
possible bias or malice motivating the child to testify. But at least
one court has held that the attorney need not be in the same room as
the child during the interview. The New Jersey Superior Court in In
re M.S. 54 found that the use of a tape recorder and voice transmis-
sion equipment to relay the testimony of the child to the parent and
his attorney in another room was not a, violation of the parent's sixth
amendment rights. Because the parent, through his counsel, was per-
mitted to question the child the court held that the parent had been
afforded the right to cross-examine the witness, even though there
had been no actual face-to-face confrontation. 55 Thus, the holding of
In re M.S. affords a trial judge broad discretion to conduct in cam-
era interviews of a child provided the parent has an opportunity to
challenge the testimony. Permitting children to testify in the privacy
of the judge's chambers spares them the trauma of testifying in open
court.50 This procedure best ensures that the child will testify truth-
fully because the threat of the alleged abuser's presence has been
removed.5
In Cruz v. Commonwealth,58 the Commonwealth Court held
that the State's interest in protecting child abuse victims and in
liberty, or property of mature parties, but with the status and best interest of a
ten and one half year old child, who also has as much at stake as any other party
and who also has a fundamental right, equal at least in importance to the rights
of the other parties, to be dealt with fairly.
Id. at -, 638 P.2d at 723.
53. See, e.g., Sipe v. Shaffer, 263 Pa. Super. 27, 396 A.2d 1359 (1979); Common-
wealth ex. rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973).
54. 185 N.J. Super. 3, 447 A.2d 183 (1982).
55. Id. at 6, 447 A.2d at 185. Accord In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979). In In
re C.L.T., a mother's parental rights were terminated based in part on tape recorded testimony
given by the investigating social worker. Because the mother's attorney had questioned the
witness, the court found that "the opportunity for effective cross-examination was presented.
The due process clause requires no rhore." Id. at 522 n.8.
56. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 50, 638 P.2d
717 (1981) (in camera questioning found to protect the child from possible harmful effects of
a direct confrontation with his parents); In re Driscoll, 410 So.2d 255 (La. 1982) (child was
found to have a justifiable and genuine fear of her father, the alleged abuser); In re M.S., 185
N.J. Super. 3, 447 A.2d 183 (1982) (record showed that child was emotionally disturbed and
that a private interview would be more likely to elicit a genuine and reliable response); see also
Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 302 A.2d 682 (1973) (in camera interview of a
young child was used in a divorce-custody case to protect the child from possible severe psy-
chological trauma).
57. See generally Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or a
Perpetrator, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982) (discussion of the psychological dilemma that
face children who have to testify against their parents); Meyers, Little Witnesses, STUDENT
LAW., Sept. 1982, at 14 (examination of the problems faced by prosecuting attorneys in a
sexual abuse case when the only witness to the crime was the child-victim).
58. - Pa. Commw. - , 472 A.2d 725 (1984).
preventing future abuse is paramount to the parent's interest, and
that the Child Protective Services Law is a legitimate and appropri-
ate means to that end.59 The court then held, citing Matthews v.
Eldridge, ° that the procedural safeguards due a person accused of
child abuse was to be determined by considering the following: first,
the affect of the Commonwealth's action on the accused's interest;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the
availability and effectiveness of substitute or additional procedural
safeguards; last, the administrative or fiscal burdens that the substi-
tute or additional procedural safeguards would impose on the
Commonwealth."1
Having established the basis for its examination, the court
turned to the contentions of the appellant, Alcides Cruz. Cruz as-
serted that his due process right of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion was violated when his children were questioned in camera. Cruz
further argued that the in camera proceedings deprived him of his
constitutionally protected interest in his good reputation.62 In sup-
port of his contentions, Cruz relied on In re Jones6s for the proposi-
tion that a parent has a right to personally confront and cross-ex-
amine his children at the hearing. The Commonwealth Court
reasoned, however, that the instant case was different because, un-
like the parent in Jones, Cruz knew the identity of the in camera
witnesses.64
This distinction is important because knowledge of the identity
of an adverse witness allows knowledge of any malice, vindictiveness,
or prejudice that may prompt the witness to testify against the ac-
cused.05 Thus, the court found that the appellant's sixth amendment
rights were not violated by the in camera questioning of his children
because the appellant had ample opportunity to interview the chil-
dren through his attorney prior to the hearing. The appellant's attor-
ney was present at the in camera questioning and had the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witnesses to further ensure the protection
59. Id. at - , 472 A.2d at 728.
60. 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
61. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at - , 472 A.2d at 728.
62. The court expressed some doubt as to whether Cruz actually had a constitutionally
protected interest in his good reputation. The Department of Public Welfare relied on Paul. v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) to support its contention that interest in a good reputation is not
sufficient to trigger due process protections. The Commonwealth Court declined to decide this
issue because it concluded that Cruz had been "afforded all the process he was due." Id. at
-, 472 A.2d at 728 n.3.
63. 286 Pa. Super. 574, 429 A.2d 671 (1981).
64. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at - , 472 A.2d at 727.
65. "In order to determine the credibility of this witness and the value of his testimony,
the party adversely affected by his testimony must be informed of his identity and thus be
given the opportunity to bring forth any possible bias motivating the damaging testimony." In
re Jones, 286 Pa. Super. at 583, 429 A.2d at 676.
of the appellant's interests.6" Using the Matthews test, the court rec-
ognized that while Cruz had an important interest in maintaining his
parental rights, this interest was not jeopardized by the use of in
camera questioning.
6 7
Cruz's next contention centered on his alleged due process right
to ascertain the identity of the person who made the initial report of
suspected child abuse to the child protective service.6 8 Cruz also at-
tacked the constitutionality of the Child Protective Services Law on
the grounds that it denies the subject of the report an unqualified
right to know the identity of the person initiating the report.69 The
court refused Cruz's "invitation to wade into these constitutional wa-
ters," stating that Cruz had not attempted to ascertain the identity
of the person who made the report.7°
Cruz further contended that the report should be expunged
from the central register because the Department of Public Welfare
hearing took place after the statute of limitations prescribed by the
Law had run."t The court found this argument to be without merit.
It reasoned that statutes of limitation prescribed by the Law were
for the benefit of the child and were not to be used to shield an
66. The court devised a balancing test by which Cruz's interest in being able to con-
front and question his children was measured against the best interests of the children:
[T]he ever-growing complexity of the dynamics between public and private in-
terests requires a careful weighing of the importance of the respective interests
involved and of the costs of employing alternative procedures. In light of the
procedural safeguards which were accorded the appellant, and the marginal ben-
efit which would have been derived from his presence as compared to the possi-
ble detriment to the children, we conclude that he had no right to be present
during his children's testimony.
Cruz, Pa. Commw. at -. 472 A.2d at 729.
67. See In re Leslie H., No. 38 Harrisburg 1983, slip. op. (Pa. Super. July, 13, 1984).
The trial judge had interviewed the victim in camera with neither the parents nor their attor-
ney present. The Superior Court found that the parent's due process right to confrontation and
cross-examination had been violated and remanded the case with instructions to follow the
procedure approved in Cruz.
68. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at __ , 472 A.2d at 729.
69. But cf. Sims v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
The District Court found TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.06 (Vernon 1975) unconstitutional be-
cause it provided for a central register where child abuse investigatory reports could be dissem-
inated without judicial review. "A state may deny the parents access to the records concerning
their family only where the source must remain confidential or where there has been a judicial
determination of the need for confidentiality in an adversary proceeding." Sims, 438 F. Supp.
at 1191.
70. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at __ , 472 A.2d at 729. "There is no indication that the
appellant ever requested from the Department of Public Welfare the identity of the person
who originally ,made the report. Having never sought that information, he cannot complain
now that his constitutional rights were violated." Id. The court further noted that § 2215(c) of
the Child Protective Services Law specifically provides for the disclosure of the identity of the
person initiating the report if the Department determines that such disclosure will not threaten
the safety of that person.
71. Cruz construed the statutory requirement that an oral report of suspected child
abuse he filed immediately and a written report be filed within 48 hours after the oral report as
a statute of limitations. The court found nothing in the record that suggested "any deviation
from the reporting procedures prescribed by the Law." Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at - n.4,
472 A.2d at 729 n.4.
alleged abuser from an adjudication.72 If the time limitation abbrevi-
ated the period during which a child could report a case of abuse, in
many cases, including the instant one,73 child protective services
would be unable to protect a child in need, and this, the court held,
would circumvent the legislative intent. 4
Cruz finally asserted that the Law requires a physical and psy-
chological examination of the abused child and that his children had
not undergone these examinations. The court found no language in
the Law that absolutely requires a medical examination of the vic-
tim. Rather, the court noted that the Law designates "available
medical evidence" as one of three bases for an indicated report of
child abuse. 5 The court also recognized that in many sexual abuse
cases, children do not manifest physical injury, and therefore pre-
cluding medical evidence. 6 In the instant case, the court held that
because the report was made two years after the abuse, the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare was correct in not subjecting the victim to a
medical examination." The Department of Public Welfare, merely
recommends psychiatric examinations, the court noted, thus no error
was committed when the victim failed to undergo a psychiatric eval-
uation.78 Therefore, the Commonwealth Court found the hearing
conducted by the Department of Public Welfare to be in compliance
with the Child Protective Services Law. 9
The decision of the Commonwealth Court in Cruz v. Common-
wealth marks the first judicial determination of the constitutionality
of the Child Protective Services Law. With this decision, child pro-
tective agencies will be freer to help abuse and neglect victims, and
the Pennsylvania General Assembly will be encouraged to enact
more laws to deal with the problems of child abuse and neg-
lect. 80MISSING Undoubtedly, this decision will encourage informal-
ity in child abuse and neglect proceedings. A less formal proceeding
will increase the accuracy of the fact finding, thus enabling the court
72. Id. at -, 472 A.2d at 730.
73. Cruz's daughter reported the incidents of sexual abuse to her mother only after she
learned that Cruz might be granted visitation privileges. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
77. Cruz, - Pa. Commw. at __, 472 A.2d at 730.
78. Id. at 731.
79. Id.
80. The court found that because both the victim and her brother "gave graphic testi-
mony of repeated incidents of sexual intercourse" and Cruz was unable to either discredit or
refute the testimony, the decision of the Department of Public Welfare was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Id. Cruz's petition for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied
on May 31, 1984.
to better tailor its order to the treatment needs of the victims and
their families.
Elizabeth Bitner
